This note explores the determinants of intra-industry trade by extending the standard Chamberlinian-Ricardian monopolistic competition trade model (e.g., Krugman, 1979) to have a continuum of industries (e.g., Dornbush et al. 1977) . It will be shown that the degree of crosscountry technical differences among industries plays an important role as a determinant of trade within each industry.
Introduction
Over the past several decades a vast literature has developed on the emergence of intra-industry trade (i.e., two-way trade of differentiated products).
Among several competing models of intra-industry trade, Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models of trade have been extensively investigated since the seminal work of Krugman (1979) . Helpman's (1981) seminal integration of the monopolistic competition trade model into a neoclassical framework, which has been extended and made popular by Helpman and Krugman (1985) , has led to the widely-held belief that neoclassical and new trade theories are complementary in nature.
1 Those models are very successful in explaining the emergence of intra-industry trade.
To focus on the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition, a standard one-factor model assumes cross-country technical homogeneity:
each firm in the monopolistically competitive sector incurs an identical fixed cost (wα) and a constant marginal cost (wβ), where w is the wage rate. As a result, there has been little investigation of the role of technical heterogeneity among countries. However, the Ricardian comparative advantage, which plays a basic role in traditional international-trade context, is worthy of more attention. To address this point, Kikuchi (2004) explored crosscountry technical heterogeneity in both fixed costs and marginal costs as a determinant of trade patterns. Within a two-country, two-industry frame-work, he showed that the manufacturing sector is agglomerated in a country and intra-industry trade is very unlikely in a trading equilibrium.
The present note takes Kikuchi (2004) as its point of departure, and extends his analysis to include a continuum of industries as did Dornbush et al. (1977) . In each industry, both fixed costs and marginal costs can differ between countries. It will be shown that the equilibrium specialization pattern is determined by the technology index. It will also be shown that trade patterns, particularly the emergence of intra-industry trade, are crucially dependent on the shape of the technology index schedule, which is taken from Dornbush et al. (1977) . That is, if technical standardization occurs and the share of similar industries becomes larger between countries, the possibility of intra-industry trade rises.
This note is closely related to Venables (1999) , which explored the division of industries between countries in a multi-industry framework with crosscountry technical differences. However, he used a framework in which there are both transport costs and linkages through intermediate inputs: his focus was on the interaction between technical differences and agglomeration forces via input-output linkages. In contrast, in this note we assume away such aspects (e.g., sources of agglomeration forces such as input-output linkages) and focus on the interaction between cross-country technical differences and trade patterns.
The next section develops a Chamberlinian-Ricardian model with a continuum of industries. Section 3 deals with the determinants of trade patterns.
Section 4 discusses some implications of the analysis.
Suppose that there are two countries in the world, Home and Foreign. Home (Foreign) is endowed with L (L) units of labor and the only source of income in a long-run equilibrium is the wage, w (w). We assume that there is a continuum of manufacturing industries with mass M. 2 Industry specific variables will be indexed by industry label i. Consumers preferences are
represented by a nested function with CES subutilities:
where X(i) is the quantity index (subutility) of industry i: they purchase equal values of the output of all industries. Each industry is modeled as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistically competitive industry and the quantity index is defined as
, where n i (ñ i ) is the number of products produced in industry i in Home
) is the consumption of the k (k)-th differentiated product produced in industry i in Home (Foreign), and σ is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of products.
The price index of industry i can be obtained as:
where
) is the price of the k (k)-th differentiated product produced in industry i in Home (Foreign). Note that the Home's total revenue in a long-run equilibrium is wL, which will be equally expended in each industry. Solving consumers' maximization problem yields the following demand functions for Home consumers:
Assuming that the products are transported free between countries, then the prices of each product in two countries are equal. Therefore, the demand functions for Foreign consumers arẽ
Differentiated products are supplied by monopolistically competitive firms.
There is cross-country technical heterogeneity: each Home (Foreign) firm in industry i has both α i (α i ) units of labor as a fixed input and β i (β i ) units of labor as a marginal input. With the number of firms being very large, the elasticity of demand for each product becomes σ. Thus, each product is priced at a markup over marginal cost:
Using these pricing equations, the summation in equation (2) takes the form
Substituting this into the demand function yields the profit function of each Home firm
Similarly, the profit function of each Foreign firm is
Now turn to the specialization pattern of industry i. In the long-run trading equilibrium with zero transport costs, we need non-positive profits in 3 Hereafter, the subscript k is often dropped for simplicity.
industry i in each country, with profits being equal to zero if production takes place. Thus, by setting profits equal to zero for both countries (π i =π i = 0),
we would like to test whether the co-existence of both countries' firms is consistent with equilibrium.
First, let us draw attention to the condition that, if both countries' firms in industry i co-exist, profits must be identical for each country's firms, i.e.,
This is the condition that must be satisfied if π i =π i = 0 is to hold. Substituting (4) and (5) into (6), we obtain
Inserting the RHS of (7) into the profit function yields
It is important to note that, given (6) holds, profits are independent of both the total number of firms and market size.
Before turning to the case of co-existence, note that the equilibrium number of firms for the case in which only one country's firms exist is
where T denotes a trading equilibrium value.
Using these results, we can obtain the necessary condition for the coexistence of firms. Let us define a technology index for industry i:
In the free-trade equilibrium the profit must be zero: [Proof] Suppose that A(i) > ω. In this case, both countries' firms cannot coexist. To see that the case where only Home firms are active is an equilibrium, note that
4 Since the elasticity of substitution between varieties differs quite a lot across sectors (e.g., Broda and Weinstein, 2004) , the index should allow for different elasticities in different sectors as follows:
In order to make analysis tractable, however, we concentrate on the technical differences and downplay the differences in substitutability between sectors. This kind of extension needs further consideration. 
This becomes negative if

Trade Patterns
To obtain the world trading equilibrium, we index industries in order of diminishing Home comparative advantage.
where A(i) is defined in (8) . This schedule is drawn in Figure 1 as the downward sloping locus AA. Now assume that there is a flat segment in the AA schedule: a partition of industries (from m tom) is assumed to have the equal level of the technology index. We can interpret this as follows:
(a) due to closer economic integration, production technologies have become standardized between countries, or alternatively, (b) even though firms in each industry produce differentiated products, production technologies of these industries have become standardized due to increased information flow between industries. 5 We should notice that the interpretation (a) does not imply an equalization of technological parameters (i.e., α =α and β =β). Let us assume that, for the partition of industries, (1) Foreign technology is inferior in the sense that it requires more labor, and (2) the ratio of fixed cost to marginal cost is identical between countries:
In this case, from (8), A(i) = γ holds for the partition of industries. 6 Since the technology index is defined as a quotient, the schedule could be flat even if cross-country productivity differences remain. The required condition for the flat segment is not the equalization of technological parameters, but the equalization of the ratio α/β (i.e., the relative importance of fixed cost to marginal cost). 5 We will discuss the two possibilities in the next section. 6 An equalization of technological parameters corresponds to the case where γ=1 holds. This schedule is drawn in Figure 1 as the upward sloping locus OB and is obtained by rewriting the equation in the form:
The equilibrium relative wage is obtained as the intersection of schedules AA and OB. Now assume that the intersection is obtained at the flat segment in the AA schedule. Thus, the following condition holds.
In this case, from Proposition 1, firms within these industries can be located in both countries. Therefore, intra-industry trade within these industries will occur.
Proposition 2 Given that there is a flat segment in the AA schedule and the
OB schedule cuts that segment, intra-industry trade occurs between countries.
Using We should notice the limitation of Proposition 2. It is clear from Proposition 1 that intra-industry trade occurs as a result of equalization of the technology index and the relative wage rate. Thus, given that intra-industry trade prevails in some industries, when a very small shock changes the technological parameters, production and trade structure also have to be changed drastically (i.e., intra-industry trade ceases). In other words, a flat segment of the AA schedule, on which the existence of intra-industry trade crucially depends, is a knife-edge case.
Discussion
In the last section, we have shown, given that there is a flat segment in the AA schedule, intra-industry trade occurs between countries. Here, we provide two cases in which there is a flat segment.
Economic Integration and Technological Spillover across Countries
In the literature of endogenous growth, it is often assumed that closer economic integration can be achieved by increasing trade in goods or increasing flow of ideas across borders. 7 This implies that a firm in a given industry acquires technical information from the activities of firms in its own industry operating in other countries. According to this line, suppose that, at least in some industries, production technologies have become standardized (i.e., the ratio α/β is equalized between countries) by increased economic integration (see Figure 2 ).
Before closer integration occurs, cross-country information flow is limited and there are no flat segment in the AA schedule: no intra-industry trade 
Technological Spillover across Industries
There is another case for the existence of the flat segment: inter-industry technological spillover within each country. 9 In this case, although products in different industries are highly differentiated each other, production technologies of these industries have become standardized due to increased information flow between industries. 10 Thus, the following hold:
8 See Section 3. 9 According to this point, most of the literature of learning by doing assumes that firms learn more from the experiences of other domestic producers than they do from firms located abroad. See, for example, Bardhan (1970) . Martin and Ottaviano (1999) also examines the case of local spillovers which occurs as the benefit of interactions with producers of other goods. Note that, as same as the case of economic integration, the value of the technology index need not to be 1 (as Figure 1) : even if standardization across industries occurs, productivity differences between countries may remain.
In this case, Ricardian productivity differences play an important role in determining the relative wage. On the other hand, this case also emphasizes that a rise in the number of standardized industries may also bring to the fore Chamberlinian determinants of trade.
If there is only one monopolistically competitive industry in the economy, intra-industry trade is obtained as a result of identical technologies between countries and wage rate equalization. 11 In our model, however, wage rates need not be equalized to obtain intra-industry trade. This is more plausi- Second, intra-industry trade emerges as a result of the equalization of the relative wage rate and the technology index, which is also supported by the 11 Krugman (1979, p. 476 ).
existence of the flat segment of the AA schedule. The shape of technology index schedule, which reflects the structure of productivity differences between industries, plays a more important role as a determinant of trade within each industry.
